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U.N. Border Force May Be All That Can Stop Chaos in Gaza
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More in Forward ForumFor months Israel has criticized Egypt’s inability to seal off its border with Gaza, and without a doubt the border has been penetrated by tunnels and smugglers. But as the Egyptian ambassador to Washington pointed out to me the other day, it is not an easy task to seal that border and, in fact, Israel had never been able to do so during its long occupation of Gaza. As the Egyptians have noted in the past, they have had neither the manpower nor the weapons needed to do an adequate job on the border because of the security restrictions imposed by Egypt’s peace treaty with Israel.
As much became clear in late January, when Hamas blew holes in the fence separating Gaza from Egypt and thousands of Palestinians poured into Egypt to buy critically short supplies and other goods that had been blocked by the Israelis. After the buying frenzy was over, Egypt was able to restore order with the support of Hamas, and has since reportedly doubled its force on the Gaza border to as many as 1,500 guards with Israel’s silent acquiescence.
There is no reason to believe, however, that even an enlarged contingent of Egyptian guards could or would prevent Hamas from blowing open the border at will in the future. This constitutes a critical chink in the Israeli blockade, one that has serious long-term consequences for Israel.
The January breakout from Gaza opened a door for Hamas to smuggle in improved rockets that are now reaching the city of Ashkelon. The fact is that Hamas retains the option of opening the border to resupply their inventory of long-range weapons from Iran at any time in the future. It will not be hard for Hamas to break through the border again and organize thousands of Gazans to cross into Egypt if the promise is for basic supplies and luxuries that have been denied by the Israeli blockade.
Under the conditions prevalent at an uncontrolled border, the resupplying of weapons is nearly inevitable. And when the border opens, foreign volunteers from Al Qaeda or other terrorist organizations may be able to slip through. Indeed, a smattering of reports about an Al Qaeda presence in Gaza have already surfaced, and Israel’s chief of military intelligence has said that Syrian- and Iranian-trained terrorists infiltrated Gaza after the border was breached.
In short, the situation is getting worse and far more dangerous for Israeli civilians living in close proximity to Gaza. Israel — and, if news reports are correct, the United States — will inevitably raise the stakes for Egypt by demanding that it seal the border. But the question is: What can Egypt do to stop the traffic?
What is certain is that the Egyptians will not open fire on Gazan women, children and civilians. So where is the security for Israel in all of this?
As the conflict over Gaza heats up and Israeli incursions and attacks increase the civilian body count, Arab public opinion will only become more inflamed by the graphic television images being broadcast out of the Strip. As it is, sympathy is building for Hamas and its hold on Gaza is strengthening. If the long-term policy of the United States and Israel is to discredit Hamas and build up the West Bank-based Fatah leadership under Mahmoud Abbas, then the Gaza policy is an absolute failure.
For Egypt, it is hardly a comforting proposition to have an open border with Hamas, which is an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood, Egypt’s main opposition movement, and is increasingly identified with Iran and some would say Al Qaeda. But with public opinion aroused in Cairo, there are limits to what the Egyptians can do. The reality is that in this situation there is no security for Egypt either.
The progressive improvement in Hamas’s inventory of rockets and the escalating violence against Israeli cities will be an intolerable situation for any Israeli government. Hamas will invite through its actions further large-scale Israeli ground operations, possibly leading to the reoccupation of Gaza, if not today then in the future.
Negotiations between Palestinians and Israelis will be the first casualty. The second casualty will be the two-state solution.
No matter how you look at it, Hamas wins. Hamas wins by losing Gaza, where in any event it cannot offer a better life for the Palestinians due to American and Israeli policies. Hamas also wins by standing up to Israel and against President Bush’s Middle East policy. And Hamas wins because of the political undertow that will further discredit Abbas and a policy of moderation. Hamas wins because we will be entering the third intifada.
There may be nothing we can do about this. There certainly is nothing Egypt can do. But it is not inconceivable that the international community could step in, through the United Nations, to save all the parties from themselves.
A robust U.N. force with a Chapter VII mandate could control the Gaza-Egyptian border, provide a rational and controlled exit-and-entry point for Gazans and their goods, and starve Hamas of its military potential rather than its humanitarian or political capabilities. But this can only happen if Israel and the United States come to recognize that military operations cannot destroy the idea of Hamas, that Hamas represents a sizable constituency in Gaza and a growing constituency in the West Bank, and that Israeli military operations are making Hamas stronger politically, not weaker.
A properly constructed U.N. force could take the pressure off Egypt, talk directly with Hamas and relieve the economic pressure on all Gazans at the same time as it reduced the threat of more sophisticated arms flowing to the most radical elements of Hamas and other radical and militant organizations. And by opening a channel to Hamas and reducing the pressure of the blockade, a cease-fire might become possible.
A U.N. force on the Egypt-Gaza border is not, of course, the solution to the broader problems facing Israel and the Palestinians, but we have hit a tipping point where the region is sinking into a future of increasing violence and casualties on all sides — a future that none of the parties to the conflict should want.
Edward Walker, a former ambassador to Israel and to Egypt, is a professor of global and political theory at Hamilton College.
Comments
with all due respect...this is nonsense.
The conditions in Gaza are worse because of Hamas, and not because of America or Israel. Hamas would rather create humanitarian crises that can be blamed on Israel, and to fire rockets at Israel than to care for its own people.
Palestinians under Hamas are much worse off than when they were under the control of Israel. Ask the Palestinians themselves. More than 80 percent of them want Israel to return, and some would start another intifada to prevent them from being part of a state run by either Hamas or the PA.
The only solution is for Israel to reake control of Gaza. If you'll notice, I said "control," not "occupation," because there has NEVER, EVER been any "occupation" by Israel. Palestinians can repeat the word a million times, and that would not change the fact that Gaza was ceded to Israel by Egypt as part of their peace agreement. Egypt did, in fact, occupy Gaza illegally, because it was originally classified as "disputed territory" with both Israel and Palestinian Arabs laying claims to it. It should have been Israel's territory outright if the United Nations had followed through with the Balfour Declaration.
No other country on earth would allow a terrorist NGO to constantly bombard it with rockets. Certainly, no Arab state would allow it. Gaza is NOT an independent nation, and Hamas is not the government of an independent nation. Therefore, they should not be granted the same rights as nations.
UN forces are farces. They looked the other way while Hezbollah rearmed instead of disarmed. UNWRA also participated in actions against Israel, so don't even think about the UN doing anything helpful.
Here is an intelligent analysis:
ISRAEL'S NO-WIN STRATEGY By Daniel Doron March 8, 2008
Jerusalem
The massacre of rabbinical students Thursday at a Jerusalem seminary highlights the failure of the powerful Israeli military to stop the assaults of Palestinian terrorists. It also reveals serious deficiencies in Israel's strategy and tactics.
These have cost Israel dearly. They also harm the world-wide war on terror, of which Israel is on the forefront.
You can't stop every suicide bomber of course. But for seven years now, Hamas terrorists have been rocketing southern Israeli towns from Gaza. Israeli governments headed by Ehud Barak, Ariel Sharon and Ehud Olmert have all vowed to put an end to the attacks. Despite Israel's overwhelming military superiority, its governments have failed to do so.
Israel has scored some impressive victories in its fight against terrorism, especially from attacks originating in the West Bank. Numerous attempts by Fatah and Hamas to dispatch bombers into Israel were frustrated by a combination of excellent intelligence, daring special operations, and the ability of the army to enter Palestinian-ruled areas in hot pursuit or for preemptive strikes. Not so in Gaza.
There, a radicalized population has elected a Hamas government determined to eliminate Israel. After Israel unconditionally retreated from the northern Gaza strip -- hoping that the Palestinians would concentrate on state building -- the territory was immediately used for attacks on Israel. Why has Israel failed to stop them?
Governments here -- behemoths whose budgets consume about a half the nation's $160 billion GDP -- are generally dysfunctional. They are hamstrung by constant internal squabbles and Byzantine bureaucracies. As became evident as early as the 1973 Yom Kippur War, their dysfunction has infected the Israeli defense establishment. In that year, a totally surprised Israeli cabinet and military leadership reacted with confusion and ineptness that almost led to the country's ruin. The recent Winograd Commission of Inquiry report on the Second Lebanon War indicates that these faults are endemic to the over-centralized yet disorganized Israeli system of governance.
More than in most countries, Israeli politicians are preoccupied with political machinations designed to buy support from powerful interest groups by distributing government largesse. This causes not only the factionalization of politics and growing corruption, but consumes time and energy that leadership should use to address life and death issues. As the Winograd Commission attested, Mr. Olmert's government initiated the Second Lebanon War without proper discussion or preparation. During the relatively long war government and military leaders failed to define their objectives. They issued vague and contradictory directives, causing repeated failures and unnecessary loss of life. Only the exceptional bravery and tenacity of Israel's soldiers and field commanders and of the rocketed Israeli population saved the day.
Israeli governments have done little to stop the massive rearmament of Hamas in Gaza with Iranian weapons, bought with Saudi money and transported into Gaza with the connivance of Egypt. Israel did not even press its great ally, the U.S., to lean on Egypt and put an end to this flagrant violation of its peace agreement with Israel -- a peace agreement for which Egypt is rewarded by billions in U.S. aid.
But the worst failures stem from adoption of a no-win strategy. Many in Israel's top political and military echelons have convinced themselves that terrorism cannot be defeated by force, that to stop it one must compromise and accept some of its demands. But how do you "compromise" with a terrorist organization sworn to destroy you?
The Israeli leadership's lack of determination to win, and its chronic political weakness, have prevented it from resisting pressure from Europe and certain American circles (mostly the State Department and the CIA) to accommodate Hamas and strengthen the allegedly peace-loving Palestinian Authority. Amazingly, Israel keeps supplying Hamas, for "humanitarian reasons," with subsidized electricity and materiel including the steel and chemicals needed to produce the rockets that attack it. It keeps providing money and weapons to prop up the hopelessly corrupt Palestinian Authority.
So what is the one strategy that can win? History has shown time and again that military confrontation does work. Israel could achieve military victory by eliminating or incarcerating Hamas's leadership, not two or three a month (so that they are replaceable) but a few hundred at once. By breaking its command structure and its logistical apparatus, Hamas can be rendered inoperative.
But for this to happen, Israel and Western democracies must treat the terrorists' mortal challenge as a war for survival, not as a series of skirmishes. And in war, you must fight to win, by all traditional means.
Mr. Doron is president of the Israel Center for Social and Economic Progress (www.icsep.org.il).
Nonsense. If you want an intelligent analysis, read the following article in the Wall Street Journal concerning Israel's No-Win Policy:
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB120494577501721717.html?mod=special_page_campaign2008_mostpop
Edward Walker proposes that the Israeli hated UN send more goyim to enforce its starvation blockade on the Gazan part of Palestine.
Good for Israel if the goyim again fall for his anguished suggestion.
"Egyptians will not open fire on Gazan women, children and civilians. So where is the security for Israel in all of this?" [If they are not willing to "open fire" to protect the "security" of the Israeli occupation of Palestine?
Instead, he should advocate that Israel abandon "Piece" and another "Piece" for Peace - otherwise, as my "Chosen World - Our war on Islam and our own freedoms" suggests, Israel may end up moving to Canada - lock, stock and WMD.
The problem with this proposal is contained in the article itself. The author writes that "What is certain is that the Egyptians will not open fire on Gazan women, children and civilians." If that is what it takes to close the border, why should we think that a UN-sponsored force could "fire on Gazan women, children and civilians," either. So why is this a solution to the problem. What could a UN force do that an Egyptian force couldn't do?
For that matter, an international force here, supplied by the EU, has already failed.
I'd like to believe that a UN force would stop the problem, but I don't see any reason to.