Is the Outline of a Peace Deal Really All That Clear?

The Strategic Interest

By Yossi Alpher

Published December 12, 2007, issue of December 14, 2007.
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‘Truthfully,” Tony Blair said barely a month ago, “if you took any group of well-educated Israelis or Palestinians and said to them, describe on two sheets of paper the rough solution to the core final status issues — territory, right of return, Jerusalem — they could probably do it roughly along the same contours of a solution.”

The Quartet’s envoy to the Middle East is far from the only one to hold this belief. Indeed, it has become common wisdom that the parameters to a successful two-state solution are quite clear.

This notion that the contours of a solution are obvious, however, is patently incorrect. Worse, it obfuscates the real areas of controversy that separate Israelis and Palestinians and that have to be addressed if we are to reach even a partial solution to the conflict.

What is perhaps most striking about the substantive gaps ignored by Blair and others is that they have widened in recent years — primarily due to changing Israeli positions on final status issues since the abortive summit at Camp David in July 2000. Indeed, the Palestinian side has been remarkably consistent in its positions, which reflect the belief that having conceded Israeli sovereignty over the state that lies within the 1967 lines, the Palestinians cannot be expected to offer additional concessions. The changes in Israel’s positions are in many ways an adjustment necessitated by Israeli recognition of the Palestinian refusal to offer appreciable concessions on the core issues.

Let us take the issue areas enunciated by Blair one-by-one and examine just how considerable the gap now is.

We begin with territory. At Camp David, Prime Minister Ehud Barak and Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat were close to agreement on the settlement blocs Israel would annex, disagreeing mainly on the ratio of territorial compensation Israel would offer. Barak even allowed that parts of the Jordan Valley which Israel deemed vital for security reasons could be turned over to the Palestinians after an agreed-upon number of years. By 2003, when the United States occupied Iraq, even that security necessity became moot, as Israel could look east all the way to the Iraq-Iran border and see only friendly neighbors.

Since then the settlement blocs have continued to grow, while empty areas adjacent to the Green Line that Israel could offer to the Palestinians in return have become scarcer. Moreover, the Olmert government has correctly perceived the strategic value of a Gaza-West Bank corridor for a Palestinian state and attaches greater value to it within the framework of territorial swaps. Finally, with Iraq in collapse and Iran emerging as the hegemon in all or most of a future Iraq and thereby directly threatening Saudi Arabia and Jordan, Israel can no longer easily cite a date certain for transferring control over the Jordan Valley to a Palestinian state.

Moving to the right of return issue, the Israeli mainstream has in recent years concluded from Palestinian demands and behavior that the ideal Palestinian vision of a two-state solution comprises an Arab state alongside a state called Israel that is understood by Palestinians to be a binational Jewish-Arab state. Israel as Palestinians wish to see it would have a fast-growing indigenous Arab population and would confront pressures to absorb Palestinian refugees based on Israeli de facto recognition that in 1948 it was born in sin by expelling the indigenous Palestinians.

Aspects of this position are now reflected in mainstream Israeli Arab position papers that have been published during the past year. This means that the future status of Israel’s Palestinian citizens has now become yet another Israeli-Palestinian issue characterized by a growing perceptual gap. This position is also clearly reflected in the refusal of the Palestinian leadership to acknowledge, as part of the successful peace process envisioned by the Olmert government, that Israel is a Jewish state as constituted in 1947 by United Nations General Assembly Resolution 181 — the authoritative document under international law that created a two-state solution to the conflict.

The Israeli “Jewish state” demand was nowhere on the agenda at Camp David in 2000. Today, however, with its very different perception of the ultimate Arab understanding of a two-state solution, Israel cannot permit itself in final status negotiations to accept even the symbolic return of a few thousand refugees — unless the Palestinians renounce the right of return and accept Israel as a Jewish state (with a protected Palestinian national minority). The gap between the two sides’ positions on this issue is considerably greater today than that reflected at Camp David, or in the parameters laid out by President Clinton before he left office, or in the Geneva Accords drawn up in 2003.

Finally, Jerusalem. It was only at Camp David and thereafter that leading Palestinian spokesmen, from Arafat and Mahmoud Abbas on down, informed their Israeli counterparts that in fact there had never been a Jewish temple on the Temple Mount. According to authoritative Palestinians, it was only at Camp David that the Palestinian side realized for the first time how important the Temple Mount actually is to Jews.

Never mind that prior to the conflict, Arab historiography readily acknowledged that the mosques on the Temple Mount, or Haram al-Sharif as it is known in Arabic, were deliberately built on the ruins of the Temple in order for Islam to benefit from the perception of being a continuation of Judaism. Today the Palestinians are unable to accept a solution that acknowledges the historic Hebrew roots of the mount and provides accordingly for Jewish access. And mainstream Israel is unable to accept anything less, insofar as it would officially feed the Palestinian narrative that the Jews of Israel are merely a band of colonialists who lack roots in the land that they took by force.

That, Mr. Blair, would only fuel the conflict, not end it.

Yossi Alpher, a former senior adviser to Prime Minister Ehud Barak and former director of the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, is co-editor of the bitterlemons family of online publications.


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Comments
Marty S. Sun. Dec 16, 2007

The Geneva Accord is the most reasonable and hopeful solution. Perhaps for those reasons it is being ignored by both sides. Yossi Alpher's article casually dismisses it by saying "the gap" between the Arabs and Israelis has increased since the initiative's release in 2003. Check it out for yourselves, <a href="http://www.geneva-accord.org/HomePage.aspx?FolderID=11&lang=en">http://www.geneva-accord.org/HomePage.aspx?FolderID=11&lang=en</a> Regarding some other comments: Some argue that the Palestinians won't accept "Israel's legitimate right to exist" and some make Israel's case by saying "the U.S. won't give back the land to the Indians." The Palestinians under Abbas have said they will recognize Israel's 1967 borders but they don't accept the phrase "legitimate right" because those words negate their 1948 experience when they fled in terror after Deir Yassen and the Irgun's attack on Haifa. Do American Indians feel that Americans had a "legitimate right" to conquer them? Regarding Jerusalem, most secular Israelis and Jews are ok with giving the Palestinians a portion of East Jerusalem. After all, how many Israelis want an additional 200,000 Arab citizens? Part of moving forward is reconciling the past. The Geneva Accord takes everything into consideration. Please review and discuss it.

Martin Sat. Dec 15, 2007

To Dan Chazan: I appreciate that you have given this matter a lot of thought. However I humbly suggest you ask yourself the following question. In any negotiations with Israel,are the Palestinians negotiating about the future borders of Israel or are they negotiating about whether ISRAEL HAS THE RIGHT TO EXIST AT ALL?? The honest answer to this fundamental question holds the key to whether or not a negotiated peace agreement is possible. Every other aspect of peace negotiations- Jerusalem, right of return,Temple Mount,etc.etc. all become moot if the honest answer to my fundamental question is that the Palestinians DENY Israel the right to exist. The sad fact of the matter,as I see it, is the Palestinians have never and will never accept the existence of Israel in what they consider Muslim land. Israel on the other hand will never agree to cease its existence as a Jewish State. Hence endless ongoing stalemate and war. What are the only other options? [1] An all-out war to the point where one side surrenders unconditionally (unlikely). and [2]the arrival of Moshiach (also not obviously imminent, but hopefully soon).

Dan Chazan Sat. Dec 15, 2007

Why is it impossible in the current framework to reach agreement? The reason is simple. If an agreement is reached, there will be a demand from the Palestinians for a rapid implementation. For Israel this means uncontrolled implementation by a powerless president with no ability to carry out even the more basic of steps to control the terror. Similarly in view of that reality there will be a great deal of opposition in Israel to withdraw quickly thus grid locking the process. This means that Israel will not allow an agreement to be reached. There is a way arround this. It is to agree today that following the attainment of an agreement on the shape of the final status, there will be negotiations on a detailed staged implementation agreement. The implementation agreement will describe the stages in which control of terror in the territories will be transfered from Israel to the Palestinians in stages allowing the Palestinians time to build their internal security forces and bringing forth an effective control of terror while at the same time creating a viable working Palestinian state which can speak with one voice. This allows time to track the process on both sides. As the Palestinians watch control being tranfered to themselves they become more ready to fight terror. As Israelis see Palestinians actually control terror according to the implementation plan they have more confidence in the desireablity of withdrawal. The moving force is the knowledge that if each side carries out the next step, the final status which both sides agreed to will be reached.

Dan Chazan Sat. Dec 15, 2007

The degree to which both sides are convinced that the other side does not want a real peace is somewhat distressing. Many if not most Israelis are convinced that all Palestinians are rabid Islamists and most Palestinians are convinced that all Israelis are rabid expantionist wanting nothing less then domination of the West band. Both sides have clear proofs. For Israelis the non stop Kassams the statements of even moderate Palestinian leaders that the ROR will not be given up and the vote for the Hamas are clear evidence. For Palestinians the non stop march of settlments leave no doubt that Israel will never compromise. However it is not at all clear that Islamism is the main driving force behind a basically national conflict between Israel and the palestinians. It is also clear that Israelis will be ready to accept "painful concessions" for peace. Further more both sides have been made painfully aware of the limitations of force in solving the conflict. It is therefor likely that an agreement could be reached as a result of the Annapolis process. Yet it is probably true that no agreement will be reached for a totally different reason.

Dan Chazan Sat. Dec 15, 2007

There is a lot of validity to all the comments abov. However, it seems to me that there is another side to all of them. 1) Territorial. In the end it all depends on whether there will be peace with a stable Palestinian state or only an Israeli withdrawal with no true peace. I cannot see Israel acquiescing to the second option. In that case there will be no withdrawal. If on the other hand there is a stable Palestinian state a defense pact with the Palestinian state would allow Israel to maintain camps along the Jordan valley which would be reinforced in case of an attack. Another option is for Israel to simply be allowed to step into those areas should the need arise, namely an imminent attack by say the Iranians somehow getting through Jordan. The whole issue seems a little moot since in the presence of a stable Palestinian state which is susceptible to Israeli retaliation the added value of the Jordan valley seems minimal. I know that for the defense pact there will be the issue of who decides there is an imminent attack. There are two possibilities here. The first is that the Palestinians are cooperating with the attackers or at least are sympathetic to their aims in which case Israel might well wish to declare war on the Palestinians as well and this deterrent value will probably stop any such act. If the Palestinians are deterred, presumably Israeli pressure will allow Israel to step into the Jordan valley to create a defensive belt. The more I think about the issue the less it seems a real issue. It is unlikely that Israel's security will indeed be affected by whether there are forces in the Jordan valley or not. What is critical is a stable partner for peace. 2) Refugees. Accepting 20000 or so mostly aged refugees or even more, seems to me totally irrelevant to the "demographic bomb". The main issue is indeed having a real way to get lots of refugees resettled as citizens of some countries with the help of proper compensation. All the rest does not seem relevant. The geographic growth of the settlement blocks is indeed a problem and those blocks will have to be re-sized probably. As it does not add such a large number to the people who have to be moved it is not critical. As for the availability of areas for exchange, well the same applies. Some people may have to be moved in addition to those in the outlying territories. If a true peace is at stake people will make the compromises. If people do not expect the peace to work out nothing will be acceptable. So the plan I described is critical to make it impossible for an extensive Israeli withdrawal without the Palestinians creating a stable state. 3) Jerusalem. Again if people believe that indeed there will be a true and stable peace the question is what is more important for the long term survival of Israel and the Palestinians, peace or some formal definition?

Lawrence Grodman Fri. Dec 14, 2007

Why is "right of return" of Palestinians even considered when almost 900,000 Jews from Arab lands were expelled and their property and funds taken in the late 1940s and early 1950s? Any discussion and settlement MUST take this issue into serious account. Further, why discuss anything seriously until the 3 Israeli soldiers taken 1 1/2 years ago are returned?

Donald A. Rosenberg Wed. Dec 12, 2007

There should be no negotiations with the Arabs until they recognize Israel as our Jewish country and homeland period.....!!!You can't negotiate with idiots that want to rewrite and revise history to negate Jewish history and give land and benefits to Arabs that have absolutely no right to. Let the Muslims give us part of Mecca and Medina? The Arab Muslims do not own the WORLD !!!

Amos Picker Fri. Dec 14, 2007

I was born in Israel, and visit the country often. There is NO solution to a conflict which deems the Israelis intruders in the Islamic world of the Middle East Jihad's culture. The Israeli's open society of free expression and western style behavior is a threat to the Islamic austerity, which is the root of the power for domination of the Islamic masses by the Mullahs. Any solution will be only a temporary one, until the Muslims ( Palestinians) get to the position of eradication of the little area called Israel from the midst of their world, and all agreements and compromises hinge on VERBAL commitments by the ARABS, and territorial, economical and social commitments by the Israelis. The Israelis are asked to provide for TANGIBLE concessions, while the Palestinians are asked to "PROMIS". No, there is no solution. In time there will continues to exist via its power of economic and scientific strides, and the Arabs finally will realize that Israel is an asset to their region, not a liability, and this will only happen at a time when the Islamic world will drift away from jihad to reality and desire to be free. We are wasting time and energy to solve the unsolvable. The 'refugees' which are the ONLY ONES IN HOISTORY who have been granted that status to 2nd and 3rd generation, must settle where they are. They will NOT go back to Israel. No more than the American will surrender Manhattan to the Indians, or California and Texas to Mexico. All that political hoopla is about elections, not about a solution. Amos Picker

Shalom Freedman Thu. Dec 13, 2007

This is unfortunately an accurate description of what has happened since the Barak- Arafat - Clinton negotiation in 2000. The element of refusal to recognize Israel as a Jewish state is a major change for the negative- especially in regard to Israel's own Palestinian Arab minority. Any future negotiation must re-consider the future political affiliation of a group which refuses to accept its minority status within a democratic Jewish state.

Bevalosian Ralbag Thu. Dec 13, 2007

Why should Israel concede to a permanent Arab minority within its state? Some rethinking is badly needed. With a Palestinian state in existence, we must assume, indeed we must insist, that Israeli Arabs become citizens of this state, which they so strongly support, even as they oppose the State of Israel. They need not be physically displaced; their towns and villages can simply be annexed to the Palestinian state, in exchange for annexation of Jewish settlement blocks to the State of Israel. The creation of non-contiguous regions within each state is a problem only within the context of hostility between neighbors. In an era of true peace, such non-contiguous regions can be readily accomodated. Utopian? No more so than the idea of peace between neighbors when one of them is pledged to destroy the other. If real peace is to be achieved, not just an agreement to coexist between hostile parties, then stranger things are possible.

Martin Thu. Dec 13, 2007

Tony Blair may be a sincere and dedicated seeker of peace in the Middle East, but it should be clear to those with even the flimsiest knowledge of the history of the conflict, that he is way beyond his depth in his attempt to negotiate a settlement. The fundamental error common to all previous failed attempts is the failure to admit that this conflict is first and foremost a religious one. Two religions claim rights to the same piece of real estate. While one side-Israel- appears willing to make certain geographic compromises to achieve a final peace agreement, there is NO concept of compromise on tha Palestinian side; Islam does not recognize the concept of compromise and will continue its Jihad until the last man.Even within Israel, the Torah observant community is only willing to go only "so far" for the sake of true peace. Thus there is no reasonable hope for a negotiated peace now or ever in this tragic situation. Our only hope is the speedy arrival of Moshiach Tzedkeinu.


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